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1. INTRODUCTION
‘Globally trade policy provisions need to be used more effectively to increase access 
to care. The availability of low-cost generic drugs needs to be expanded, in accor-
dance with national laws and international trade agreements and with a guarantee 
of their quality … We need to find ways of more effectively using trade policy pro-
visions, such as compulsory licensing or parallel importation, to increase access to 
care. The availability of low-cost generic drugs needs to be expanded, in accordance 
with national laws and international trade agreements and with guarantees of their 
quality.’1
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement 
of 1994, an outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations, radically altered the 
role of international trade law in promoting and enforcing intellectual property 
protection around the globe.2 This important, yet controversial, international 
agreement requires members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to imple-
ment strong intellectual property protections in their domestic law. Indeed the 
emergence of the TRIPS Agreement at the end of deliberations in Marrakesh 
has been described as a major tactical victory for rich countries and pharma-
ceutical companies.3 Prior to 1994, countries of the world were not obligated 
to grant patent rights for pharmaceutical products, but with the signing of the 
TRIPS Agreement this changed. Along with this change, patent protection 
for pharmaceuticals, and the impact such patent protection is likely to have 
on access to medicines for the world’s poor, have become a major source of 
confl ict between rich and poor nations. 
 African countries remain particularly worst affected by this development. 
This is a continent that is grappling with various problems including poverty, 
confl icts and devastating diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. 
While Africa constitutes about ten percent of the world’s population it is home 
to over 70 percent of people living with HIV. In 2006 alone, approximately 
three million people were reported to have lost their lives as a result of HIV/
AIDS related illness, 70 percent of which were from sub-Sahara Africa.4 
Women have been the worst affected by the epidemic, constituting about 50 
percent of the world infection rate and about 60 percent of the total rate in 
Africa.5 In many African countries, access to treatment and care for people 
1.  Report of the UN Secretary General to the UN General Assembly meeting issued on 16 
February 2001, UN Doc. A/55/779. 
2.  The TRIPS Agreement was part of the Final Act establishing the WTO commonly referred 
to as the ‘Marrakech Agreement’, attached as Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement.
3.  See M.A. Santoro, ‘Human Rights and Human Needs: Diverse Moral Principles Justifying 
Third World Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs’, 31 North Carolina Journal of International 
Law and Commercial Regulation (2006) p. 923 at p. 926.
4.  UNAIDS, Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (Geneva, UNAIDS 2006) p. 6.
5.  Ibid.
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living with HIV remains a great challenge. Of the approximately 4.6 million 
people in need of treatment, only about 23 per cent of them are receiving it in 
the region.6 The problem is not limited to HIV/AIDS alone. Other diseases such 
as tuberculosis and malaria continue to pose great threats to lives in Africa. 
 It is recognised that the TRIPS Agreement contains some safeguard provi-
sions, such as parallel imports, early working exception and compulsory 
licensing, which African countries can explore to ensure access to life-saving 
medications for their citizens. However, implementation of these provisions 
in practice has not been as easy as expected. Attempts at invoking these fl ex-
ibility provisions under TRIPS, especially compulsory licensing, have often met 
with stiff opposition from developed countries and pharmaceutical companies. 
Compulsory licensing is a license issued by a state authority to a government 
agency, a company or other party to use a patent without the patent holder’s 
consent. Usually royalty is paid to the patent holder as a form of compensation 
for the use of its patent. It is very crucial and can play a great role in ensuring 
access to life-saving medications for people living with HIV in developing 
countries. It must be noted that a denial of access to life-saving medications 
is a human rights issue, as it may have direct implications on the enjoyment of 
an individual’s rights to health and life guaranteed in numerous human rights 
instruments. The right to life is the most fundamental of all human rights that 
must be held in great sanctity.7 On the other hand, the right to health relates to 
both physical and mental well-being of an individual. These rights are nega-
tively threatened due to inaccessibility to life-saving drugs in Africa. 
 One needs to point out here that recent developments in the world seem to 
show that cheaper drugs are being made available in developing countries due 
to a series of international initiatives and support from developed countries 
such as the Global Fund and the United States (US) government’s President 
Emergency Plan Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). More importantly, one must 
commend the initiatives and efforts of the Clinton Foundation for being able to 
strike some deals with pharmaceutical companies to sell HIV/AIDS drugs at a 
cheaper price in some developing countries.8 However, drugs made available 
under these initiatives are reaching very few people. There are better opportuni-
ties for developing countries to scale up treatment for their citizens if they are 
allowed to effectively invoke the fl exibility provisions contained in the TRIPS 
Agreement particularly compulsory licensing. But with limited resources and 
high cost of drugs, particularly for second-line drugs for HIV/AIDS treatment, 
just a handful of people can at present be reached. 
6.  Ibid.
7.  Human Rights Committee, The Right to Life, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40.
8.  See L. Altman, ‘Clinton Group Gets Discount for AIDS Drugs’, New York Times, 24 Octo-
ber 2003, p. 1, where it was reported that the Foundation has struck a deal with some pharmaceuti-
cal companies to sell ARVs at cheaper prices in some countries in Africa and the Caribbean.
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 It is against this backdrop that this article examines the importance of 
compulsory licensing – using a human rights lens – to facilitate access to life-
saving medications for Africans and its use after the historic decision at Doha in 
2001 (popularly called ‘Doha Declaration’). It further considers the August 2003 
Decision of the Council for TRIPS and the subsequent December 2005 amend-
ment of the TRIPS Agreement in an attempt to resolve paragraph 6 of Doha 
Declaration and submits that both are neither faithful to the spirit of Doha nor 
are they in line with provisions of human rights instruments, which guarantee 
the rights to health and life. Also, the article reasons that recent developments 
in the world on the use of compulsory licensing, such as the new Canadian 
legislation on this issue, have not in any way brought succor to Africans. The 
article further argues that in view of the above situations, particularly the failure 
of both the August 2003 Decision of Council for TRIPS and its amendment of 
TRIPS Agreement to fi nd a lasting solution to the unresolved paragraph 6 of 
Doha, African countries may need to be creative in invoking other provisions of 
the TRIPS, such as Article 31(k) so as to ensure affordable medicines for their 
citizens. The article then considers the likely tension that may exist between 
human rights and intellectual property rights, and submits that the obligations of 
states under the former should supercede the latter. 
2. ACCESS TO MEDICINES AS A HUMAN RIGHT
The TRIPS Agreement most signifi cantly has serious implications for access 
to life-saving medications in Africa. Access to treatment forms an integral part 
of the right to health guaranteed in so many international human rights instru-
ments. Notable among these instruments include Article 25 of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR),9 Article 12 of the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),10 Article 12, of the 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW),11 Article 16 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter),12 just to mention a few. However, the most authoritative of 
these instruments is Article 12 of ICESCR, which guarantees the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health to every one. It similarly recognises the 
9.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/810 (10 Decem-
ber 1948).
10.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 
1966, GA Res. 2200 (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS p. 3 (entered into force 3 January 
1976).
11.  Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, GA Res. 
54/180, UN GAOR, 34th Session, Supp. No. 46, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1980).
12.  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5; 
 adopted by the Organization of African Unity, 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986.
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importance of other determinants of health such as clean water, clean environ-
ment and so on to the enjoyment of this right.
 The Committee on the Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) in its General Comment 14 has noted that the basic elements of the 
right to health include availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality.13 
Access to medicines requires that such medicines must be accessible and 
affordable. The Committee has similarly noted that economic accessibility 
or affordability presupposes that health facilities, goods and services must 
be affordable to all.14 It notes further that payment for health-care services, 
as well as services related to the underlying determinants of health (including 
drugs), must be based on the principle of equity, which demands that ‘poorer 
households should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses as 
compared to richer households’.15 Ensuring access to health facilities especially 
for marginalised groups constitutes one of the core obligations of the right to 
health.16 It is to be noted that states are obligated to respect, protect and fulfi ll 
the right to health. The implication of these obligations vis-à-vis obligations 
under intellectual property law is considered later in another section of this 
article.
 Inability of Africans to have access to life-saving medications in the context 
of life threatening diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, 
compromises their right to health. Heywood has noted that ‘breakthroughs 
in some crucial areas of medicine and paralysis in others, place unparalleled 
importance on access to drugs as part of the right to health’.17 Lack of access to 
medicines may similarly implicate on the right to life. Since the enjoyment of 
the right to health is dependent on other rights such as human dignity, freedom 
of association, right to housing, right to life, etc.18 This is an affi rmation of the 
interrelatedness, interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights – civil 
and political and social and economic rights – as pronounced at the Vienna 
Programme of Action.19
 Traditionally, the right to life is viewed as a negative right to prevent inten-
tional loss of lives. However, recent developments now view the right to life 
as a positive right placing an obligation on states to protect unintentional loss 
of lives.20 For instance, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held 
13.  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Right to the Highest Attain-
able Standard of Health, General Comment No. 14, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para. 12.
14.  Ibid. 
15.  Ibid.
16.  Ibid., para. 43.
17.  M. Heywood, ‘Chaffed and Waxed Suffi cient: Drug, Access, Patent and Global Health’, 
23 Third World Quarterly (2002) p. 217 at p. 218.
18.  General Comment 14, supra n. 13, para. 3.
19.  Vienna Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/24, Part 1, Chap. III.
20.  R.J. Cook, et al., Reproductive Health and Human Rights Integrating Medicine, Ethics and 
Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press 2003) p. 161.
boek_NILR2008-1.indb   37 25-4-2008   10:03:11
E. DUROJAYE38 NILR 2008
that the government of Guatemala was responsible for loss of life arising from 
shabby treatment meted out to street children. In arriving at its decision the 
Court noted as follows:
‘The fundamental right to life includes not only the right of every human being not 
to be deprived of his/her life arbitrarily but also the right that he/she will not be pre-
vented from having access to conditions that guarantee a dignified existence.’21
Also, the Supreme Court in Costa Rica has held that a denial of access to life-
saving medication for people infected with HIV impugns on their right to life.22 
 Regarding access to life-saving medications, Yamin has pointed out that 
given the indispensability of these drugs to life, any policy by the state, which 
may diminish physical accessibility and affordability to them will ultimately 
deprive people of their right to life.23 The Human Rights Committee in its 
Comment 6 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) has suggested that the right to life in Article 6 of the Covenant 
should not be given a narrow interpretation but should be seen to affect other 
rights such as the rights to housing, food and medical care.24 
3. EVENTS PRECEDING THE DOHA DECLARATION 
At the start of the new millennium, the impact of TRIPS was beginning to be 
felt by developing countries, particularly Africa, just as the devastating effect 
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic deepened. Prices of life-saving medicines were 
no longer within the reach of the people even as they became more urgently 
indispensable to preserve lives. In Nigeria, for instance, prices of antiretro-
viral drugs (ARVs) during that period ranged between 100 to 200 US dollars 
monthly.25 This is inaccessibly high for a country where the majority of citizens 
live on less than one dollar a day. Many of the developing countries blamed the 
TRIPS Agreement for being a barrier to life-saving medications. They argued 
that patent rights on drugs lead to monopoly and precipitated prohibitive cost of 
21.  Villagran Marales et al v. Guatemala, Series C No. 65, 19 November 1999, para. 144; 
see also The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria, Communication 155/96, decided at the African Commission’s Ordinary Session 
held from 1 to 27 October 2001; similarly see the Indian Supreme Court decision in Pachim Banga 
Khet Majoor Samity v. State of West Bangal [1996] AIR SC 2426. 
22.  Alvarez v. Ccaja Costarricense de Seguro Social Exp, 5778-V-97, No. 5934-97, cited 
by A.E. Yamin, ‘Not Just a Tragedy: Access to Medication as a Right under International Law’, 
21 Boston Univ. ILJ (2003) p. 326.
23.  Yamin, supra n. 22, at p. 326. 
24.  Human Rights Committee, The Right to Life, supra n. 7.
25.  K. Peterson and O. Obileye, Access to Drugs for HIV/AIDS and Related Opportunistic 
Infections in Nigeria (Abuja, Policy Project 2002) p. 13.
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drugs. Furthermore, they reject as fl imsy and baseless the need to compensate 
invention and promote research and development as justifi cations for patent on 
drugs, asserting that cost of research and development in a country like the US, 
which is home to many of the pharmaceutical companies, is borne by public 
institutions.26 Crucially, it is noted that Africa accounts for only one percent of 
world’s medicine market and if there were no patent protection in Africa and no 
sales by pharmaceutical companies their profi ts from drugs will by no means be 
affected.27
 Pharmaceutical companies have, however, insisted that unless there is an 
incentive for research and development in the name of patents, new drugs 
may not be discovered. They reject the argument that patent hinders access 
to medicines in developing countries but rather cite poor infrastructure, poor 
distribution system, coupled with low morale of health workers due to poor 
salaries as obstacles to access to medicines in developing countries.28 But the 
truth remains that patent rights inhibit access to essential medicines in Africa 
and other poor regions of world.29 This is most pronounced in the case of life-
saving medications particularly for HIV/AIDS where demands for such drugs 
are usually inelastic. In a situation as this, higher prices do not diminish demand 
for these drugs, as they remain essential regardless of high prices.30
 The essence of intellectual property rights, and in particular patent, is 
to provide necessary incentives for research and technological development. 
Patents are said to be time-bound monopoly rights, which constitute a deroga-
tion from the principle of free trade because they offer exclusive rights to an 
inventor to exploit the invention and prevent others from using same without 
his/her consent.31 
 There are two basic reasons, which have been adduced to justify the need for 
protection of intellectual property rights. One has to do with the theory of fair 
compensation while the other relates to incentives to encourage invention.32 The 
26.  M. Foreman, et al., Beyond Our Means? The Cost of Treating HIV/AIDS in the Develop-
ing Countries (London, Panos Institute 2000) p. 1.
27.  P. Boulet, et al., Drug Patents under the Spotlight: Sharing Practical Knowledge about 
Pharmaceutical Patents (Geneva, MSF 2003) p. 6.
28.  International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and Access to HIV/
AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Sahara Africa (Washington, DC, IIPI 2000) p. 24.
29.  See Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (independent commission set up by Brit-
ish government), Final Report, September 2002, available at <www.iprcommission.org> (accessed 
on 29 September 2007). The report fi nds intellectual property rights impose costs on most develop-
ing countries and do not help to reduce poverty.
30.  E. Cameron, ‘Patents and Public Health: Principles, Politics and Paradox’, a paper deliv-
ered at the Inaugural British Academy Law Lecture held at University of Edinburgh on 19 October 
2004.
31.  P. Cullet, ‘Patents and Medicines: The Relationship between TRIPS and Human Rights to 
Health’, 79 International Affairs (2003) p. 140.
32.  J. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 2nd edn. (London, 
Routledge 1999) p. 32. 
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theory of fair compensation is based on Locke’s labour theory of property. This 
theory asserts that one owns the fruits of one’s labour.33 In other words, this 
theory seems to equate intellectual property with other property such as land, 
and asserts that an inventor must be fairly compensated for time and energy 
invested in his/her invention. However, this argument has been criticised in the 
sense that it limits present access to products so as to encourage future develop-
ment of new products to which, ironically, access is also limited.34 Furthermore, 
this theory is subject to two qualifi cations. One is that it will only suffi ce for 
as long as the society is not left worse off by reason of one’s appropriation.35 
In this situation there is no objection to benefi ting from fruits of one’s labour. 
Hettinger has, however, observed that patent runs foul of this qualifi cation 
since people who come up with same invention as one already patented are 
restricted from selling or even using their inventions.36 The other is that acquisi-
tion of property rights must not be subject to prohibition from spoilage.37 That 
is, appropriations of property should avoid unnecessary wastefulness. Also, it 
would appear intellectual property rights contradict this proviso in the sense that 
full exercise of rights in intellectual property limits certain benefi cial uses of the 
protected products.38 
 The second theory supporting the need for intellectual property rights asserts 
that little incentives to innovate exist where people are allowed to be rewarded 
for their inventions at little or no cost. This is known as the so-called ‘free rider’ 
problem. The argument here is that without appropriate protection for intellec-
tual property rights there will be no motivation to innovate. While it is possible 
that intellectual property protection could encourage innovation, it has been 
disputed that strong intellectual property rights ‘increase the availability and 
use of intellectual products more than they restrict this availability and use’.39 A 
report has further disproved this point noting that in poor regions most affected 
by diseases where limited purchasing power exists, patents are not a relevant 
factor in stimulating research and development or bringing new products into 
the market.40 Indeed, Berger argues that little evidence exists to support the 
33.  R.E. Meiners and R.J. Staaf, ‘Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or Monopo-
ly?’, 13 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (1990) p. 911 at p. 915.
34.  Cameron, supra n. 30. 
35.  E.C. Hettinger, ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’, 18 Philosophy and Public Affair (1989) 
p. 31 at p. 35.
36.  Ibid. 
37.  J. Locke, ‘The Second Treaties of Government’, in P. Laslet, ed., An Essay Concerning the 
True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government (Cambridge, University Press 1988) p. 308.
38.  J.M. Berger, ‘Tripping over Patents: AIDS, Access to Treatment and the Manufacturing of 
Scarcity’, 17 Connecticut JIL (2002) p. 157 at p. 173.
39.  Hettinger, supra n. 35.
40.  See WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, ‘Innovation and Public Health, 
Framework paper’, July 2006, available at <www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/
CIPIH23032006.pdf> (accessed on 1 October 2007).
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hypothesis that extended period of intellectual property protection promotes 
innovation.41 On the contrary, it has been suggested that innovation is fuelled by 
‘looming expiration’ of intellectual property protection.42 
 Efforts made by developing countries, during this period, to ensure access to 
medicines for their people by invoking the fl exibility provisions were opposed 
by pharmaceutical companies. Specifi c situations related to that of Thailand, 
Brazil and South Africa. Under the Brazilian patent law, Article 68 permits the 
use of compulsory licensing.43 A threat by the Brazilian government to invoke 
this law to ensure access to HIV/AIDS medications for her citizens incurred the 
wrath of America, which fi led a petition before the WTO panel opposing the 
action of the Brazilian government. This petition was later withdrawn, by which 
time the Brazilian government through its threat, had forced pharmaceutical 
companies to reduce prices of patented HIV/AIDS drugs in that country. 
 Also, worthy of mention was the court action instituted by about 39 pharma-
ceutical companies against the South African government for enacting a new 
patent law in 1997.44 The court action fi led at a Pretoria High Court challenged 
sections 15C and 22C of the law that permit the South African government to 
use both parallel importation and compulsory licensing respectively in the wake 
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the country.45 The pharmaceutical companies, 
backed by America, claimed that the new law contravened the TRIPS Agree-
ment and the Constitution of South Africa 1996. A determined South African 
government had insisted that its action was never inconsistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement. However, a fi erce campaign by civil society groups and non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) across the globe led to the withdrawal of the 
suit from court by the pharmaceutical companies, by which time the event had 
led to a public relation disaster for the pharmaceutical companies. There were 
two major fallouts of this case. First, it provoked a clarifi cation to the so-called 
fl exibility of the TRIPS Agreement especially as regards public health. Second, 
it clearly brought to the fore the fact that developed countries that exercised 
trade pressures in order to safeguard interests of pharmaceutical companies 
could no longer do so without some repercussions even within their terri-
tory.46
41.  Berger, supra n. 38, at p. 173.
42.  A.B. Engelberg, ‘Special Patent Provision for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their 
Usefulness? A Political, Legislative and Legal History of US Law and Observation for the Future’, 
39 Idea (1999) p. 389 at p. 421.
43.  Industrial Property Law Act No. 23 (1998), which provides: ‘A patent owner shall be sub-
ject to the grant of compulsory licence of his patent if the rights resulting therefrom are exercised 
in an abusive manner or if the patent is used in abused of economic power, as proven by an admin-
istrative or judicial decision pursuant to the provisions of the law.’
44.  See Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 (1997).
45.  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa v. President of the Republic 
of South Africa, Case No. 4183/98 (fi led 18 February 1998) (HC). 
46.  E. ’t Hoen, ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines’, 3 Chi-
cago JIL (2002) p. 31.
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 Although this case was withdrawn from court, it would have been interesting 
to know the outcome had the court the opportunity to decide on the merits of the 
case taking into consideration Section 25 of the South African Constitution of 
1996. This Section of the Constitution guarantees the right to property. It further 
provides that in the event of expropriation of a property by the government ‘just 
and equitable compensation’ must be paid to the owner of the property.47 It must 
be stated here that it remains uncertain whether an invocation of compulsory 
licensing to override patent rights under the South African Constitution will 
amount to an expropriation.48 But assuming it does, what is the implication of 
this? The logical answer will be that patent holders will be entitled to compen-
sation in accordance with the provision of the Constitution. 
 However, certain factors such as the use of property, history of acquisi-
tion, nature of state investment in the acquisition, purpose of acquisition and 
so on must be taken into consideration by the court to determine the nature of 
compensation. In other words, if the property has been used to the detriment of 
the society, for instance, if it is found that prices of patent drugs in South Africa 
are higher than in other comparable countries, then the compensation payable 
will be below market value.49 Also, if the purpose for the overriding of patent 
right is to ensure access to cheaper life-saving medication, reason demands that 
the compensation payable to the patent holder by generic manufacturer should 
be minimal. Otherwise, the purpose for the issuance of the license in the fi rst 
place will be defeated.
 Other notable events which took place before Doha included the consistent 
and coordinated activities of NGOs in Africa and internationally. These orga-
nizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), ACT UP and Oxfam, were 
able to foster a formidable coalition pressing for affordable access to medica-
tions in poor countries of the world, particularly in the light of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic in sub-Sahara Africa. In furtherance of their cause, an international 
conference on Increasing Access to Medicines in a Global Economy was held in 
Amsterdam in 1999, just a few days before the Seattle WTO ministerial meet-
ing.50 Of great importance was a statement issued at the end of the Amsterdam 
meeting which raised concerns about the impact of trade policies on public 
health particularly access to HIV/AIDS medications in developing countries. 
 At the 1999 WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle, the impact of TRIPS on 
public health was not considered. However, a common working paper which 
contained a proposal ‘to issue compulsory licensing for drugs appearing on the 
lists of essential drugs of the World Health Organization (WHO)’ was devel-
47.  See Section 25(3) of the South African Constitution Act No. 108 (1996).
48.  Berger, supra n. 38, at p. 210.
49.  Ibid.
50.  ’t Hoen, supra n. 46, at p. 32.
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oped.51 It has been argued that if this proposal had been accepted, it would have 
restricted the use of compulsory licensing in developing countries since very 
few of the drugs on the WHO lists of essential drugs were patented.52 But an 
important incident took place at the Seattle meeting. A formal statement was 
issued by President Bill Clinton of the US to the effect that ‘the United States 
will henceforward implement its health care and trade policies in a manner that 
ensures that people in the poorest countries won’t have to go without medi-
cines they so desperately need’.53 This statement was later to be followed by an 
executive statement in 2000 confi rming this change in US policy.54 However, 
subsequent actions taken by America in relation to the use of the fl exibility in 
the TRIPS have proved inconsistent with this statement. Some of these actions 
are discussed in relevant parts of this article. 
 During this period two important meetings took place. One was the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS known as the 
Declaration of Commitment.55 The other was the Abuja Declaration on HIV/
AIDS and other related diseases by African leaders.56 These two important gath-
erings added powerful voices to the clamour for access to essential medicines in 
particular HIV/AIDS medications for poor countries. Both conferences recog-
nised the public health threat posed by the HIV pandemic and urged states to 
mobilize resources in addressing urgently the epidemic and provide necessary 
treatment care and support for those already infected. 
 Furthermore, the activities of UN bodies and international agencies such as 
the WHO, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, etc., added 
more weight to the clamour for access to essential medicines in developing 
countries in post TRIPS era. Notable among these included the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution 2001/33, on Access to Medi-
cation in the Context of Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS of April 2001, which 
emphasized access to treatment in the context of HIV/AIDS as a human rights. 
And the 54th World Health Assembly meeting where two resolutions – Scaling 
Up the Response to HIV/AIDS and WHO Medicines Strategy57 – were adopted. 
The issues of high cost of drugs in poor countries and impact of international 
trade on public health were addressed in these resolutions. Many of these orga-
51.  ‘Common Working Paper of the EC, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Switzland and Turkey to the 
Seattle Ministerial Declaration’, 29 November 1999, p. 3.
52.  ’t Hoen, supra n. 46, at p. 35.
53.  W.J. Clinton, ‘Remarks at a World Trade Organization Luncheon in Seattle’, 35 Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents 2494, 2427, 1 December 1999.
54.  Executive Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (2000).
55.  UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, 25-27 June 2001, UN GAOR, 26th Spe-
cial Session, Res. 33/2001.
56.  African Summit on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious Diseases, Abuja-
Nigeria, 24-27 April 2001, OAU/SPS/ABUJA/3.
57.  The 54th World Assembly Meeting of May 2001, Res. 54.10 and 54.11. 
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nizations were unanimous in the view that a strong intellectual property regime 
could be a barrier to access to life-saving medications in poor countries of the 
world. 
3.1 The Doha Declaration
The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO held in Doha in 200158 is today 
regarded as a milestone in the debate on the impact of TRIPS on access to 
medicines in world’s poorest countries. Prior to this meeting, a statement by 
the African Group on the need to confront the problem posed by access to 
medicines in the continent had been made handy in preparation for the Decla-
ration. At the TRIPS Council meeting in June of 2001 the issue of TRIPS 
and public health for the fi rst time received the attention of members. Here, 
Zimbabwe, representing the African Group, proposed issuing a separate decla-
ration on the issue of access to medicines. This statement taking into cognizance 
the grave impact of HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa reads that ‘we propose that 
Members issue a special declaration on TRIPS and Access to medicines at the 
Ministerial Conference in Qatar, affi rming that nothing in TRIPS Agreement 
should prevent members from taking measures to protect public health’.59
 In a follow up meeting of the Council in September of 2001 a whole day was 
devoted to a discussion on access to medicines. The African Group with another 
nineteen countries presented a joint proposal which would ensure that TRIPS 
will not hinder WTO members from formulating favourable public health poli-
cies. This statement also sought further clarifi cations on the use of fl exibilities 
contained in the TRIPS. Interestingly a counter proposal was made by devel-
oped countries led by the US, Japan, Switzerland, Australia and Canada. The 
proposal emphasized the need to protect intellectual property for the sake of 
research and development claiming that intellectual property contributes to 
public health objectives globally.60 Undoubtedly, the purpose of this proposal 
by developed countries is to limit the use by developing countries of the fl ex-
ibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement. 
 After so much debate, diplomatic maneuvering and compromises, some 
remarkable conclusions were reached at the Doha conference. Perhaps one of 
the most signifi cant of this seven-paragraph Declaration was the paragraph 4 of 
the Declaration which states:
58.  WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO 
Doc. No. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001).
59.  WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Discussion on Intellectual Property and Access to Medi-
cines, WTO Doc. No. IP/C/M/31 (10 July 2001), p. 4.
60.  ’t Hoen, supra n. 46, at p. 37.
boek_NILR2008-1.indb   44 25-4-2008   10:03:12
COMPULSORY LICENSING AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 45NILR 2008
‘We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from 
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commit-
ments to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ rights to 
protect public health and in particular to promote access to medicines for all.’61
This fi nally put an end to any doubt or controversy surrounding the use of the 
fl exibility provisions contained in the TRIPS Agreement to advance the inter-
ests of public health. 
 In the opening paragraphs of the Declaration, members recognised the seri-
ousness of public health issues confronting many developing countries and least 
developed countries, particularly those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria. They thus stressed the need for the TRIPS Agreement to be a part 
of the solution in addressing these public health challenges.62 
 The Declaration further reassures that the safeguards contained in the TRIPS 
should be used to overcome any barrier intellectual property may pose to access 
to medicines. It confi rmed, in unequivocal language, that the use of exceptions 
such as compulsory licensing is not limited to emergency or urgent situa-
tion only but rather it is left to members to determine when it is deemed fi t to 
invoke.63 On the issue of parallel imports, the Declaration resolves that ‘[t]he 
effects of the provision in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the use of 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to estab-
lish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge’.64
 Another important decision reached at the Declaration was the extension 
granted to least developed countries to implement the provisions of TRIPS. The 
earlier transition grace of 2006 was extended at Doha to 2016. This appears to 
be a relief for the least developed countries many of which are in Africa.65
 Also, the Declaration reminded developed countries of their unfulfi lled 
obligations under Article 66(2) of the TRIPS to provide incentives for their 
enterprises and institutions to promote technology transfer to least developed 
countries.66 The Declaration, however, was unable to fi nd a solution to the trou-
blesome Article 31(f) of TRIPS, which has been described as a stumbling block 
61.  Doha Declaration, supra n. 58, para. 4.
62.  Ibid., paras. 1 and 2.
63.  Ibid., para. 5.
64.  Ibid., para. 5(d).
65.  This has further been shortened to 1 July 2013 or until they cease to be least developed 
countries whichever, date is earlier by the Council for TRIPS Decision of 5 November 2005 with 
the exclusion of patent on pharmaceutical products which still remains 1 January 2016. A decision 
which did not augur well with most of the least developed countries.
66.  Many of these countries are from Africa. They include Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bu-
rundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauri-
tania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia.
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to the use of compulsory licensing by developing countries. Responding to this 
problem the Declaration resolves:
‘We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities 
in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of com-
pulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS 
to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council 
before the end of 2002.’67
In August of 2003 the Council for TRIPS reacted to this through a decision 
permitting member states with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacities to make effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS.68 
The Council mandated members to work towards a permanent solution to the 
problem which would involve an amendment of Article 31(f) of TRIPS. The 
contents and implications of this decision are considered in detail in subsequent 
sections of this article. 
 While the Declaration has been hailed as a ground breaking development 
in ensuring access to medicines for people in developing countries, its legal 
signifi cance remains debatable. For instance, Skyes has observed that within 
the WTO system ministerial declarations are not ‘legally binding’ but may 
serve as persuasive authority in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement.69 Another 
commentator has suggested that the Declaration goes beyond merely clarifying 
provisions of TRIPS, but may also be relied on by a member state to challenge 
the legislation of another state for being TRIPS-non-compliant.70 Abbott has 
observed that the decision at Doha would ‘appear to constitute an agreement 
on the method of application of the agreement within the meaning of Article 
31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), and to be the 
substantive equivalent of an interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement’.71 While 
the legal effects of the Doha Declaration may not be certain, there is no doubt 
that the Declaration constitutes a consensus statement of the member states 
of WTO. This Declaration, if faithfully implemented, will no doubt promote 
access to life-saving medicines for Africans. But whether or not member states 
of WTO are committed to this Declaration form the basis of the discussion in 
the subsequent sections of this article. 
67.  Doha Declaration, supra n. 58, para. 6.
68.  Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/405.
69.  A.O. Sykes, ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries and the Doha “Solution”’, 
3 Chicago JIL (2002) pp. 47-68.
70.  ’t Hoen, supra n. 46, at p. 42.
71.  F.M. Abbott, WTO TRIPS Agreement and its Implications for Access to Medicines in De-
veloping Countries, a report prepared for Intellectual Property Rights Commission (Washington 
DC, Intellectual Property Rights Commission 2002) p. 10.
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4. COMPULSORY LICENSING AFTER DOHA
Today it is no longer in doubt that the Doha Declaration constitutes a consensus 
statement of member states of WTO in protecting public health under the 
TRIPS Agreement. The fact that at Doha it was reiterated that member states 
have the right to invoke the exceptions provided under the TRIPS, particularly 
with regard to compulsory licensing, seems to vindicate attempts by developing 
countries like Brazil and South Africa to invoke these exceptions prior to Doha. 
The use of compulsory licensing has remained particularly very controversial 
even in the post Doha era. It has been widely agreed that many developing 
countries, especially those in Africa, lack the capacity to manufacture generics 
should they decide to invoke compulsory licensing in line with the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
 One of the unresolved issues in this regard by the Doha Declaration is what 
will become the fate of such nations? Will they be able to rely on imports 
from other countries? These questions have become very pertinent when one 
considers the fact that since January 2005 many developing countries have 
adapted their patent laws to be TRIPS-compliant, thus, making access to 
cheaper drugs more diffi cult. These issues including the origin and the grounds 
for the use of compulsory licensing and some development on its use are exam-
ined in this section of the article.
4.1 Origin of compulsory licensing
Compulsory licensing promotes competition and assures affordability of drugs 
while at the same time it enables patent holder to be compensated for the use of 
its invention. In most parts of the world, countries (developed and developing) 
have included provisions on compulsory licensing into their laws.72 Its use dates 
back to 1623 when the UK Statutes of Monopolies permitted the taking of a 
patent for lack of working.73 Similarly, under the French law forfeiture of patent 
for nonuse is permitted.74 The UK Patent Act of 1883 in its Section 23 allowed 
the use of compulsory licensing for cases in which the patent was not being 
worked in the UK, the reasonable requirements of the public were not satisfi ed, 
or any person was prevented from working or using an invention.
 Under the Paris Convention of 1883 the use of compulsory licensing was 
provided for in Article 5(A).2 of the Convention.75 More recently, countries 
72.  C. Corea, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing 
Countries (Buenos Aires, South Center 2000) p. 7.
73.  C. Correa, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries’, Working Papers No. 5 (Geneva, South Centre 1999).
74.  Ibid.
75.  Art. 5(A).2 provides: ‘Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative 
measures providing for the grant of compulsory licences to prevent abuses which might result 
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like the US, under its antitrust law and other legislation, have included provi-
sions on compulsory licensing.76 Countries such as Canada and Brazil have 
also provided for the use of compulsory licensing for the sake of medicines and 
public health.77 
4.1.1 Grounds for use of compulsory licensing 
Compulsory licensing is usually granted for lack of or insuffi ciency of working 
of an invention, to remedy anti-competitive practices, for cases of emergency, 
governmental or ‘crown’ use, and for other public interest grounds.78 Under 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement compulsory licensing is allowed under 
different circumstances, including public emergency, high prices and as a 
measure to remedy anti-competitive practices. It has been argued that this provi-
sion is by no mean exhaustive as members may rely on other grounds to invoke 
use of compulsory licensing.79 In other words, the categories of circumstances 
justifying use of compulsory licensing are illustrative but not exhaustive. Many 
governments in developing countries have erroneously believed that compul-
sory licensing can only be used during a period of emergency.80 But this does 
not appear to be a correct interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, as Article 31 
never restricts the use of this exception to emergency situation alone but gives 
member states latitude to decide reasons for its use provided it is done in accor-
dance with the provision of the TRIPS Agreement. It is recalled that during 
the ministerial meeting of WTO members in Doha an attempt to clarify this 
provision of TRIPS suggests that each member has the right to determine what 
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
And that public health crisis, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tubercu-
losis, malaria and other epidemics, can constitute such circumstances.81
 It must be borne in mind that a member state that intends to make the use of 
compulsory licensing must fulfi ll conditions stated in Article 31. These include 
granting of the licenses on a case-by-case basis, proof of unsuccessful earlier 
request for voluntary license, non-exclusivity of the license and, importantly, 
requirement for compensation. Furthermore, Article 31(g) of TRIPS imposes 
a heavy burden on the compulsory licensing system. This provision seems to 
suggest the possibility that a compulsory license may be terminated as soon as 
from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example failure to work.’
76.  US Clean Air Act 1988 (42 USC Sec. 7608) and Atomic Energy Act 1988 (42 USC Sec. 
2183).
77.  Corea, supra n. 72, at p. 94.
78.  Ibid., at p. 95.
79.  R. Elliott, TRIPS and Rights: International Human Rights Law, Access to Medicines, and 
the Interpretation of WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(Toronto, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network and AIDS Law Project 2001) p. 50.
80.  Ibid.
81.  Doha Declaration, supra n. 58, para. 4.
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the circumstances which led to its granting no longer exist. Corea has observed 
that a literal interpretation of this provision may ‘discourage applications for 
compulsory licenses, since the licensee may be exposed to the revocation of his/
her right at any time’.82
 In order for a country to be able to invoke compulsory licensing as a public 
policy instrument to promote access to medications, the following must be 
established:
a. It must be shown that a party granting the license within the country has 
the capability to exploit it either through manufacturing subject invention or 
importing it. This obviously requires fi nancial ability or technical capability;
b. If local manufacturing of the subject of invention is to be undertaken, there 
must be evidence of adequate purchasing power among the local population 
to justify the investment by the party exploiting the license (or opportunities 
must be available). Where the population is small or poor, as in most 
African countries, there may not be a guarantee of returns for investment;
c. Where the government is the party exploiting the compulsory license – 
for government use – or as purchasing agent on behalf of the population 
acquiring the invented subject, there must be evidence of fi nancial resources 
or technical capability; 
d. There must be evidence of an existing sound legal and political structure to 
permit the granting and monitoring of the license.83
It would appear that going by these pre-conditions for exploiting compulsory 
licensing; only developed countries and few developing countries would be able 
to successfully make use of this exception. Many African countries, possibly 
with the exception of South Africa and Egypt, lack the fi nancial wherewithal 
and the technical expertise to meet these pre-conditions. Notwithstanding, 
the issuance of compulsory licensing, especially in case of import, remains a 
viable tool in advancing access to medicines and the right to health in Africa. 
This is because it promotes competition and breaks the monopoly enjoyed by 
a patent holder on drugs, thus facilitating access to cheap drugs. In fact devel-
oped countries like America and Canada despite their level of development 
and wealth, were forced to threaten the use of compulsory license over Bayer’s 
ciprofl oxacin, a drug useful for the treatment of anthrax, at the wake of bio-
terrorism attack.84 More recently a similar step was taken in the wake of the 
bird-fl u attack. This seems to underline the importance of compulsory licensing 
in breaking monopoly of a patent holder on medicine.
82.  Corea, supra n. 73, at p. 8.
83.  Abbott, supra n. 71, at p. 14.
84.  D. Alexander, ‘“Duplicated” drugs life-line for millions in Africa: US anthrax scare re-
news debate on generic drugs law’, The Monitor, 1 November 2001, p. 15.
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 As noted earlier pharmaceutical companies and developed countries led by 
the US have shown irascible attitudes to the use of compulsory licensing. They 
have argued that it not only erodes patent right, but may encourage manufac-
turing of sub-standard drugs. This indeed is a weak and face saving argument 
that lacks merit and is insensitive to millions of lives in need of essential medi-
cines in Africa. Experience has shown that generic drugs manufactured in 
Indian and Brazil have been found to be of good quality, some even are listed 
under the WHO Essential medicines list.85
4.1.2 Limitation under Article 31(f) TRIPS 
One important limitation to the use of compulsory licensing is found in Article 
31(f) of TRIPS. This provides that ‘any such use shall be authorised predomi-
nantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorising such 
use’. The import of this phrase in paragraph (f) of Article 31 is unclear. If taken 
narrowly it would seem to suggest that compulsory licensing can only be used 
for local consumption and not for export. The likely implication of this for 
developing countries and least developed countries, particularly those in Africa, 
will be that compulsory licensing may not be useful for many of them that lack 
technological capacity to reverse engineer and manufacture drugs locally. In 
such countries access to HIV/AIDS medications may remain an unattainable 
dream.
 Abbott has pointed out that this provision constitutes an obstacle to real-
ising access to medicines for people in poor population as in Africa in two 
ways. First, by limiting availability of export drugs made under compulsory 
licensing, it invariably restricts countries that are unable to support manufac-
turing under compulsory licensing (or where patent protection is not in force) in 
the availability of supply of generic import drugs. Second, requiring compulsory 
licensees to restrict a predominant part of their production to domestic market, 
limits fl exibility of countries to authorise the export of compulsory-licensed 
drugs and thus to exploit economy of scale.86 
 The practical implication of Article 31(f) will be that, if a country like South 
Africa that has the capacity to manufacture generic drugs, has invoked the use 
of compulsory licensing, it still cannot supply neighbouring countries such as 
Lesotho or Swaziland that lack capacity to manufacture but are in dire need of 
drugs for HIV/AIDS. In the same vein, Lesotho and Swaziland would be unable 
to declare compulsory licensing to import life-saving medications from South 
Africa. Thus, demand and supply for life-saving drugs are adversely affected. 
85.  See IAVI Report, ‘Indian ARVs are returned to WHO’s arsenal of approved medi-
cines’, 3 Bulletin on Aids Vaccines (August 2005), available at <www.iavireport.org/vax/english/
Vax_2005%20_aug.pdf> (accessed on 8 June 2007).
86.  Abbott, supra n. 71, at p. 17.
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This obviously produces an anomalous situation as it prevents access to life-
saving medicines for those in dire need. 
 But could this be the aim of the provision? Baker has suggested that a 
generous interpretation be given to this provision so as to justify an exporting 
country to export a major portion of its production, provided such exports 
were necessary to have a large production runs so as to effi ciently supply the 
domestic market.87 This interpretation would seem to tally with the central prin-
ciples of TRIPS under Article 8. In Lowenfeld’s view, this provision can be 
interpreted to mean that goods under compulsory licensing should not be for 
‘export in competition with the patent holder’.88 Certainly, Article 31(f) never 
prohibits the issuance of compulsory licensing for export purpose; it merely 
places a restriction on such export.
 The truth, however, remains that many developing countries, particularly 
African countries, lack even the capacity to produce formulations and only a 
few of these countries invest in research and development for new drugs or 
even conduct research in the pharmaceutical sector.89 The only hope for such 
countries will be to rely on the use of compulsory licensing for import of 
generic drugs. Generic drugs can improve health care and reduce the monopoly 
or oligopoly powers of patent holder, but this possibility is remote and subject 
to controversy.90
 During the ministerial council meeting of WTO members in Doha this issue 
came up. It was noted that WTO members with insuffi cient or no manufac-
turing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face diffi culties in making 
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, 
a recommendation was made to the Council for TRIPS ‘to fi nd an expeditious 
solution to this problem’.91 This issue is particularly more germane in the light 
of the January 2005 deadline for developing countries like India to be TRIPS-
compliant. It is to be noted that India supplies about half the generic drugs in 
Africa.92 The likely implication of this change remains uncertain.
87.  B.K. Baker, ‘Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Action Re-
garding Paragraph 6 of Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’, 14 Indiana 
International and Comparative Law Review (2004) p. 613 at p. 665.
88.  A.S. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) 
p. 108.
89.  C. Corea, Implications of Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
(Geneva, WHO 2002) p. 22.
90.  K.R. Sirinivas, ‘Interpreting Paragraph 6 Deal on Patents and Access to Treatment’, Eco-
nomic and Political Weekly, 20 September 2003.
91.  Doha Declaration, supra n. 58, para. 6.
92.  Guardian Unlimited (Special Reports), ‘Cheap AIDS Drugs under Threat’, available at 
<www.guardian.co.uk/aids/story/0,7369,1443872,00.html> (accessed on 20 September 2005).
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4.2 The August 2003 Decision of the Council for TRIPS and its 
  implications
In what appears to be a temporary solution to the paragraph 6 problem of 
Doha Declaration, the Council for TRIPS responded in 2003 through a deci-
sion permitting member states with insuffi cient pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacities to make effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS.93 The 
Decision, which was arrived at just a few days to the WTO meeting in Cancun, 
is to the effect that countries with manufacturing capacity, in the meantime, can 
export essential medicines to countries with no or insuffi cient manufacturing 
capacity. This has been described as a temporary waiver to the paragraph 6 
problem of Doha Declaration. The Decision in its opening paragraph purports 
to limit diseases for which compulsory licensing may be issued to diseases 
mentioned in paragraph 1 of Doha Declaration that is, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria. The rationale for this is unclear, however; Baker has argued that a 
broad and generous interpretation should be given to paragraph 1 of Doha as to 
cover other important diseases.94
 The waiver can be used to the extent necessary for the purposes of producing 
a pharmaceutical product for export subject to certain conditions. The 
importing member must be either a least developed country, or a developing 
country having established insuffi cient capacity in the pharmaceutical sector, 
and having granted a compulsory license in accordance with Article 31 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.95 An additional hurdle was further created by the Chairper-
son’s Statement which accompanied the Decision.96 Thus, a developing country 
wishing to issue compulsory licensing for the purpose of import must notify the 
Council for TRIPS which will in turn review the notifi cation before giving the 
go ahead. This will either cause some delay in case of urgent need of drugs to 
address an epidemic or may even discourage developing countries from issuing 
compulsory licensing for fear of litigation which may arise from such notifi ca-
tion.
 Under the Decision an exporting member country is broadly defi ned to 
include any WTO member state. However, a restriction is placed on the quan-
tity of medicines that can be produced for export under a compulsory license.97 
The Chairperson’s Statement further states that a country issuing compulsory 
licensing for export will do so on a non-commercial basis. This could be a 
restriction on the right of generic exports and may even discourage issuing 
compulsory licensing. One may ask: what is the basis for such restriction? Since 
93.  Implementation of para. 6, supra n. 68.
94.  Baker, supra n. 87, at p. 635.
95.  Implementation of para. 6, supra n. 68, para. 2.
96.  The General Council Chairperson’s Statement, 30 August 2003, available at <www.wto.
org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm > (accessed on 20 August 2007).
97.  Implementation of para. 6, supra n. 68, para. 2(b).
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the whole essence of producing and exporting generic drugs will be to make a 
degree of profi t at least to sustain further production. 
 Similarly, an exporting member, under this Decision, shall notify the Council 
for TRIPS of the grant of the license with some vital information. Such infor-
mation will include, name and address of the licensee, the product(s) for which 
the license has been granted, the quantity or quantities for which it has been 
granted, the country or countries to which the product(s) is (are) to be supplied 
and the duration of the license. In addition the address of the website of which 
the licensee posts its required notifi cations shall be furnished.98 In order to 
prevent diversion of goods meant for developing countries to developed coun-
tries, the Decision required special branding and packaging labels for drugs 
produced for export under the Decision.
 The Decision also permits regional procurement of drugs for compul-
sory license issued under it so as to harness economies of scale and facilitate 
local production of drugs.99 This may be advantageous to African countries 
that are already members of regional economic groups as they will be able to 
pull resources together to purchase needed drugs and expand markets for local 
production of generic drugs. 
 Overall this Decision by the Council for TRIPS seems to create more hurdles 
than solution to the paragraph 6 problem of Doha. Sirinivas summarizes the 
challenges created by this decision in this way:
‘Under this deal however serious the health situation be a developing nation which 
lacks the capacity to manufacture the needed drugs will have to request another gov-
ernment to invoke compulsory licensing or suspend the rights of the patent holder 
and provide licence to local firm or firms to produce and export the needed drugs. 
The deal adds many layers of procedures to the whole process. They have to notify 
the TRIPS Council, about the intention to use this system and the country that has 
issued the compulsory licence has to meet many conditions and all these measures 
not only will delay the manufacture and supply but also increase the cost of the 
drugs.’100
It has further been observed that this Decision by the TRIPS Council and the 
subsequent statement of its chairman ‘contain several conditions and measures 
which exporting and importing countries have to comply with, raising concerns 
amongst analysts that they are too cumbersome and thus rendering the “temporary 
solution” diffi cult to operate’.101 One may reasonably conclude that this Decision 
is not faithful to the spirit of Doha nor is it consistent with promoting the right to 
98.  Ibid., para. 2(c).
99.  Ibid., para. 6.
100.  Sirinivas, supra n. 90.
101.  S. Shashikant, ‘Heated Discussions as TRIPS and Health Para 6 Deadline Is Missed’, 
Third World Network, 5 April 2005, available at <www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfo197.htm> 
(accessed on 1 July 2007).
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health. In Love’s view, this Decision means nothing but an endorsement of a new 
model of explicit protectionism. He states further:
‘The US, Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan and other developed economies will be 
allowed to bar imports from developing country generic suppliers – under completely 
irrational protectionist measures that are defended by the WTO Secretariat and its 
most powerful members as a humanitarian gesture.’102
According to Corea this so-called Decision is merely symbolic in nature and 
falls short of what can be regarded as ‘an expeditious solution’.103 He argues 
further that the series of conditions that need to be satisfi ed to make use of this 
Decision will ultimately deprive poor countries of the world needed access to 
life-saving medicines.
 Many activists and NGOs working on access to essential medicines for poor 
population have described the Council for TRIPS Decision as a ‘gift bound 
in red tape’.104 Rather than solve the paragraph 6 problem, it has merely 
compounded it. To the extent that this Decision blocks, rather than facilitates 
access to medications for people in developing countries and in particular 
Africa, it is a threat to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of phys-
ical and mental health.
 The Council in paragraph 11 of its Decision mandated members to work 
towards a permanent solution to the problem which will involve an amend-
ment of Article 31(f). Unfortunately, it took a while before this solution could 
be found. Several meetings by the Council to fi nd a solution to the problem had 
initially ended in deadlocks. Developed countries led by the US and members 
of the EC stood in the way of permanent solution to the problem claiming that it 
would render patent rights meaningless.
 Developing countries on the other hand, particularly the African Group, 
insisted on a permanent solution to paragraph 6 problem of Doha as the only 
way out to save lives of million of people dying of various diseases in the 
region. However, just a few days to the WTO meeting in Hong Kong, precisely 
on 6 December 2005 the Council for TRIPS, acting on behalf of the Ministerial 
Council, fi nally adopted an amendment to the TRIPS as a permanent solution to 
paragraph 6 problem of Doha. This becomes the fi rst amendment ever to a core 
WTO Agreement since its inception in 1995. 
102.  J. Love, ‘CPTech Statement on WTO Deal on Exports of Medicines’, 30 August 2003, 
available at <www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/cptech08302003.html> (accessed on 28 June 2007).
103.  C. Corea, ‘Recent International Developments in the Area of Intellectual Property 
Rights’, ICSTD-UNCTAD Dialogue, 2nd Bellagio Series on Development and Intellectual Prop-
erty, 18-21 September 2003, available at <www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Correa_
Bellagio2.pdf> (accessed on 10 March 2008).
104.  ‘Joint NGO Statement On TRIPS and Public Health: WTO Deal On Medicines A “GIFT” 
Bound in Red Tape’, 30 September 2003, available at <www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngos09102003.
html> (accessed on 26 June 2007).
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4.3 The 6 December 2005 amendment of the TRIPS Agreement
The so-called amendment to the TRIPS adopted by the Council for TRIPS on 6 
December 2005 was not different in elements, substantially from the 30 August 
2003 Decision of the Council, save for some slight changes in structures and 
few changes that are now added to the amendment. However, before examining 
these changes it is apposite to consider the relationship between the August 
2003 Decision of the Council and its amendment of December 2005.105 Essen-
tially, one major point to note in this respect, as provided in paragraph 11 of the 
amendment, is the fact that the Decision remains operative in a WTO member 
state until the date the amendment takes effect in that member state. In other 
words, the amendment has in no way abolished the Decision. Since the effec-
tive date of the amendment is not clearly ascertained, the implication of this is 
that the Decision may still for sometime be binding on member states. 
 Also, paragraph 11 similarly states that the amendment will be based, where 
necessary on the Decision. Thus, suggesting that, although the amendment need 
not contain same terms as the Decision, essential elements of the Decision will 
become part of the amendment. Considering the criticism levied against the 
Decision by many developing countries this provision attracted some opposi-
tion from the African Group during the negotiation of the amendment. This 
Group had proposed a substantial modifi cation of the provision of paragraph 
11 contending that certain elements of the Decision were inappropriate for the 
amendment.106 However, this argument did not seem to see the light of the day 
as eventually the amendment contains the same elements as the Decision.
 The amendment to TRIPS can be classifi ed into three main parts. Firstly, 
there is Article 31bis which contains about fi ve paragraphs, that tally to a great 
extent with the main text of paragraph 2, 3, sub-paragraph 6(1), paragraph 10, 
and 9 of the Decision respectively. 
 Secondly, the other part of the amendment is the Annex to the TRIPS Agree-
ment which contains 7 paragraphs corresponding in substance to paragraph 1, 
sub-paragraphs 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c), paragraphs 4 and 5, sub-paragraph 6(ii) and 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decision respectively.
 Finally, there is the Appendix to the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement which 
corresponds substantially to the Annex to the Decision. 
 Although one can argue that the substantive contents of the amendment in 
relation to rights and obligations of WTO members remain essentially the same 
105.  WTO General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement of 6 December 2005, 
WT/L/641.
106.  See ‘The 6 December 2005 TRIPS Amendment and Public Health at the WTO’, Intellec-
tual Property Quarterly Update, Fourth Quarterly 2005, available at <www.ciel.org/Publications/
IP_Update_4Q05.pdf> (accessed on 21 November 2007). The African Group in February of 2005 
had come up with what appeared to be a very good proposal as a solution to the para. 6 of Doha 
but this proposal was stiffl y opposed by the US and the EC countries. 
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as that of the Decision, however, there exist some major differences between 
the two. For instance, the preamble to the Decision is not included in the 
amendment even though some of the text is included in the General Council’s 
Decision adopting the amendment.
 Also, paragraph 6 of the Decision is now broken into two parts. The fi rst 
part – paragraph 6(i) of the Decision – contained in paragraph 3 of Article 
31bis and the other – paragraph 6(ii) – contained in paragraph 5 of the Annex 
to the TRIPS Agreement. Paragraph 6(i) essentially lays down the rules for 
re-export. This provision came about as a form of legal solution to the problems 
developing countries, such as in sub-Sahara Africa with small markets, may 
encounter in effectively making use of compulsory licensing. 
 The provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 31bis state that in order to create 
economies of scale and facilitate local production of pharmaceutical products, 
the requirement under the Annex stating that only the quantity necessary to 
meet the needs of the importing member state would be manufactured under the 
license would not apply if the products were exported or re-exported to other 
developing countries or least developed countries within a regional trade agree-
ment, where half of the members are least developed countries. Paragraph 5 of 
the Annex deals with the issue regarding systems of regional patents. 
 Similarly, paragraph 8 of the Decision has been modifi ed to exclude the last 
sentence which made reference to annual review being deemed to fulfi lling the 
requirements of Article IX(4) of the WTO Agreement. This modifi cation, as 
pointed out by the African Group, has become necessary in view of the fact that 
the review under Article IX(4) is only applicable to the waiver and since this is 
an amendment the provision has become otiose and does not apply.107
 It was agreed that the entry into force of the amendment will have to be 
determined in accordance with the rules guiding amendments under the WTO 
Agreement. The proper provision for this is found in Article X(3) of the WTO 
Agreement which is to the effect that any amendment to the WTO Agreement 
shall take effect upon acceptance by two third of members that have accepted 
it and thereafter for each other member upon acceptance by it.108 The provision 
equally gives the Ministerial Council the discretion, by a three-fourths majority, 
to give a member that is yet to accept an amendment to the WTO Agreement 
107.  See the legal arguments of the African Group, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/440, ibid. The African 
Group argued that certain provisions of the Decision, which have outlived their usefulness, since 
their purposes have already been served, will become redundant in the context of an amendment. 
These were referred to as self-eliminating. An example of this is para. 11 of the amendment which 
defi nes relationship between the amendment and the Decision and establishes timeliness for the 
work on the amendment. 
108.  Presently 28 countries (inclusive of the 15 members of the EC) out of 150 members of 
the WTO have accepted this amendment so far as at 1 January 2008. They include the US, India, 
Switzerland, El Salvador, Norway, Philippines, Australia, Japan, Israel, Singapore, China, Hong 
Kong, Republic of Korea and members of the EC. Information available at <www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm> (accessed on 1 February 2008).
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a certain period of time to do so or be advised to withdraw its membership of 
WTO. 
 The Protocol to the amendment provides that it shall be opened for accep-
tance to members until 1 December 2007, that is, about two years from the 
date of its adoption or such other day as decided by the Ministerial Council. 
What this means is that the exact date of entry into force of the amendment is 
not known but will be dependent upon acceptance (ratifi cation) by two-third 
of WTO members. Moreover, it could be assumed that the exact date for entry 
into force is before or after 1 December 2007. It is to be noted that even if the 
amendment eventually enters into force it may likely create an anomalous situ-
ation – temporarily – where the amendment will apply to certain members and 
the Decision to other members since, as mentioned earlier the amendment has 
not come to abrogate the Decision instantly. 
 Since the amendment to the TRIPS is based on the Decision of the Council 
for TRIPS the same criticisms levied against the Decision, earlier mentioned 
in this article, apply to the amendment. Infact, MSF has noted that it is disap-
pointing and almost unbelievable that the Council adopted an amendment based 
on the unworkable and cumbersome August 2003 Decision.109 Gathii similarly 
adds that in reality the practicability of the so-called amendment may prove 
illusory for poor countries due to the implausibility of the several conditions 
attached to it.110 In actual fact, since the Decision – which has now given birth 
to this amendment – was adopted in 2003 just one country has been able to 
successfully put it into use.111 As noted below an attempt made by MSF based 
on a new Canadian legislation – which was a response to the August 2003 Deci-
sion – failed due to the bureaucratic entanglements in the procedures.
 While it is admitted that this amendment to the TRIPS Agreement strives to 
resolve the paragraph 6 problem of the Doha Declaration, it is doubtful whether 
it will achieve this aim. This is because the several hurdles that need to be over-
come before a developing country can invoke the use of compulsory licensing, 
under it, are a betrayal of the spirit of Doha Declaration. It is like an albatross 
hanging on the necks of developing countries. It does not serve the interest of 
Africans, neither is it consistent with realising the right to health of vulnerable 
and marginalized people worst affected by life threatening diseases.
109.  MSF, Neither Expeditious, Nor a Solution: The WTO August 2003 Decision is Unwork-
able (Geneva, MSF 2006) p. 6.
110.  J. Gathii, ‘How Necessity May Preclude State Responsibility for the Compulsory Licens-
ing Under the TRIPS Agreement’, 31 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commer-
cial Regulation (2006) p. 943 at p. 956.
111.  Rwanda being a least developed country made a notifi cation to the Council for TRIPS 
in accordance with para. 2(a) of the 30 August 2003 Decision to import triple combination Triavir 
from Canada. In same manner Canada has made a notifi cation to the Council in October 2007 to 
export same drugs to Rwanda in line with para. 2(c) of the 2003 Decision. 
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4.4 The Zimbabwean experience
Zimbabwe remains one of the countries with high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS 
infection in sub-Sahara Africa. With a population of about 12 million people it 
is estimated that about 20 percent of Zimbabweans are living with HIV/AIDS. 
This translates to about one in four Zimbabweans. Life expectancy has dropped 
from 70 years before the HIV/AIDS pandemic to about 40 years.112 In May 
of 2002, the Zimbabwean government faced with about 2,000 weekly deaths 
caused by AIDS related complications and lack of access to life-saving medi-
cations for the people due to high prices of ARVs, declared HIV/AIDS a state 
of emergency in the country. At this period the price of fi rst line therapy for 
treating HIV/AIDS, cost about 1,168 US dollars per person for a year compared 
to about 412 dollars of its generic version from India.113 Only very few Zimba-
bweans could afford this.
 The government relying on Sections 34 and 35 of its Patent law114 declared 
as follows:
‘In view of the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS among the population of Zimbabwe, the 
Minister hereby declares an emergency for a period of six months, with effect from 
the date of promulgation of this notice, for the purpose of enabling the State or a 
person authorised by the Minister under section 34 of the Act
(a) to make or use any patented drug, including any antiretroviral drug used in the 
treatment of persons suffering from HIV/AIDS or HIV/AIDS related conditions;
(b) to import any generic drug used in the treatment of persons suffering from HIV/
AIDS or HIV/AIDS-related conditions.’115
According to Section 35 of the Zimbabwean Patent Act, powers given to a state 
department or an authorised minister under Section 34 in relation to an inven-
tion, shall include the power to make, use, exercise and vend the invention 
for any purpose which appears to the Minister necessary or expedient. These 
powers can be exercised in the following situations
for the effi cient prosecution of any war in which Zimbabwe may be en gaged; a. 
or 
for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the b. 
community; or 
for securing a suffi ciency of supplies and services essential to the well-being c. 
of the community; or 
112.  MSF, ‘Zimbabwe government takes emergency action against HIV/AIDS Overriding 
patents will dramatically cut price of treatment for patients’, available at <www.cptech.org/ip/
health/c/zimbabwe/msf05292002.html> (accessed on 24 June 2007).
113.  Ibid. 
114.  Patent Act (Chapter 26:03) of 1971 which has been amended severally with the last 
amendment taking place in 1994.
115.  See General Notice 240 of 27 May 2002, ‘Declaration of Period of Emergency’.
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for promoting the productivity of industry, commerce or agriculture; or d. 
for fostering and directing exports and reducing imports or imports of any e. 
classes, from all or any countries and for redressing the balance of trade; or 
generally, for ensuring that the whole resources of the community are available f. 
for use, and are used, in a manner best calculated to serve the interests of the 
community; or 
for assisting the relief of suffering and the restoration and distribution g. 
of essential supplies and services in any part of Zimbabwe or any foreign 
country that is in brave distress as the result of war.
At the time Zimbabwe was issuing compulsory licensing on patented drugs it 
lacked the necessary technical capacity to manufacture generic drugs locally. 
Thus, the only option opened to it then was to embark on import. It is worthy to 
note that at this time the paragraph 6 problem of Doha was yet to be resolved. 
The initiative and decisiveness of the Zimbabwean government to respond 
to the devastating effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the country, through 
invocation of compulsory licensing is quite commendable. It provides a good 
precedent for other African countries to emulate. This seems to tally with the 
country’s obligations to respect, protect and fulfi ll the right to health guaran-
teed under Article 12 of ICESCR and Article 16 of the African Charter both 
of which have been ratifi ed by Zimbabwe.116 Indeed the African Commission 
in the Purohit case has held that states have an obligation to ensure that health 
care facilities and commodities including drugs are made available to their citi-
zens.117 But what can not be understood is the reason behind the six months 
period for the license. Considering the magnitude of loss of lives caused by 
AIDS related illness in the country a longer period of time would have been 
appropriate pending the time situation improves.
 It is pertinent to observe that about three years after Zimbabwe invoked the 
use of compulsory licensing the situation as regards access to HIV/AIDS medi-
cines in that country has not improved. A report has it that at the end of 2006 
of about 350,000 people in need of ARVs in the country only 52,000 were 
receiving them.118 Similarly in October of 2005 it was reported that prices of 
ARVs in the country had quadrupled in the previous three months.119 Moreover, 
there have been reported cases of severe shortages in health care workers and 
116.  See S. Sacco, ‘A Comparative Study of the Implementation in Zimbabwe and South Af-
rica of the International Law Rules that Allow Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Importation for 
HIV/AIDS Drugs’, 5 African Human Rights Law Journal (2005) p. 105. 
117.  Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, Communication 241/200, decided at the 33rd ordi-
nary session of the African Commission (15-29 May 2003).
118.  WHO, ‘Towards Universal Access: Scaling up Priority HIV/AIDS Interventions in 
the Health Sector’, April 2007, available at <www.who.int/hiv/mediacentre/univeral_access_
progress_report_en.pdf (accessed on 4 July 2007).
119.  AVERT, ‘HIV & AIDS in Zimbabwe’, available at <www.avert.org/aids-zimbabwe.
htm> (accessed on 3 July 2007).
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other administrative problems in sites where government treatment has been 
provided. Compounding the situation further, the harsh economic condition of 
the country – rising infl ation and shortage of foreign currency – has translated 
to a critically low supply of ARVs in the country. Sustaining importation of 
generic drugs into the country is become increasingly diffi cult. This is an indica-
tion that the use of compulsory licensing – whether for import or to manufacture 
drugs locally – requires essentially both technological capability and political 
commitment on the part of a government. 
 This Zimbabwe example clearly exemplifi es some of the problems the issu-
ance of compulsory licensing may cause in Africa. It may be possible for a 
country to have a protective patent law which permits the use of compulsory 
licensing yet the country may be unable to effectively sustain the issuance of 
the license as seen from this Zimbabwean experience. The situation becomes 
more challenging where a country is faced with grave political and economic 
problems as Zimbabwe – this happens to be the lot of many African countries. 
In such situations, issuing compulsory licensing to import generic drugs may 
prove very challenging.
4.5 Exploring alternatives for African countries
A number of suggestions have been offered by commentators as the way out of 
the paragraph 6 problem of Doha. These suggestions have become particularly 
relevant in the light of the controversial amendment to the TRIPS Agreement 
by the Council.
 For instance, a commentator has suggested the use of the non-justicability 
exception regarding exhaustion of rights under Article 6 as a way out since 
this exception is not subject to settlement dispute under the TRIPS.120 Others 
have suggested the use of Article 31(b) and (k) of TRIPS as necessary provi-
sions to ensure access to affordable drugs to Africans. Furthermore, Gathii 
argues that African governments can invoke the principle of state necessity 
under international law to resort to the use of compulsory licensing without 
legal responsibility under the TRIPS Agreement.121 This article only considers 
the possible viability of the suggestion under Article 31(k). 
4.5.1 Article 31(k) TRIPS 
This provision is very important and may be used as an exception to the limita-
tion under Article 31(f) and the paragraph 6 Decision of the Council for TRIPS. 
It provides as follows:
120.  Commission for Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), Integrating Intellectual Property 
Rights and Development Policy (London, CIPR 2002) p. 32.
121.  Gathii, supra n. 110, at p. 957.
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‘Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and 
(f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive 
practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration in 
such cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of 
authorization if and when the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to 
recur; …’
It thus appears from this provision that a generic manufacturer operating under 
a compulsory licensing could do so on a large scale for export purpose espe-
cially when a non-special and a non-paragraph 6 compulsory license have been 
granted in the importing country.122 
 Under the TRIPS Agreement the defi nition of what may amount to ‘anti 
competitive practice’ is not provided. Thus, individual countries may provide 
appropriate defi nition to this phrase in their own laws. This will be in line with 
the provisions of Article 1 which requires member states to fashion an appro-
priate method of implementing the TRIPS Agreement and Article 8(2) which 
permits member states to prevent abuse of intellectual property rights by rights 
holders which unreasonably restrains trade. It has been argued that drug patents 
by their very nature constitute anti-competitive practices. This is because they 
allow the patent owners to exclude other manufacturers and vendors from 
exploiting the same product.123 The inevitable result of this will be high or 
excessive pricing of products.
 In case of HIV/AIDS medications where demands for them are said to be 
inelastic, prohibitive costs of these drugs in many African countries can be 
argued to amount to an act of anti-competition. This argument is buttressed 
further if it can be established that reasonable access to medicines are being 
denied due to high prices which have no bearing to the production costs, and 
that the patent holder has unreasonably refused to license its patent to generic 
producers. Under this circumstance it may be justifi ed for a country to invoke 
compulsory licensing as provided in Article 31(k).
 A good example exists in the case of South Africa. Under the South African 
Competition Act it is provided that all people will benefi t from an effi cient and 
competitive development-oriented market that balances producer, consumer and 
worker interests.124 The Act further provides supports to a market ‘in which 
consumers have access to, and can freely select, the quality and variety of goods 
and services they desire’.125 Section 1(2)(a) provides that in furtherance of the 
goal of the Act as stated in the preamble, the Act will be interpreted in a manner 
122.  Baker, supra n. 87, at p. 664.
123.  Ibid.
124.  Preamble to the Competition Act of South Africa No. 89 (1998).
125.  Ibid. 
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which gives effect to its purposes, which include the provision of ‘competitive 
prices and product choices’126 and ‘advancing social and economic welfare’.127
 In 2003 the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) lodged complaints against 
two big pharmaceutical companies – GlaxoSmithKline and Boerhringer of 
Ingelheim – for charging excessive prices for their patented anti-retroviral 
drugs. In its ruling of October 2003, the South African Competition Commis-
sion found the two pharmaceutical companies in violation of the competition 
law by charging excessive prices and unreasonably refusing to issue volun-
tary licenses to generic competitors.128 The Commission further held that these 
acts of the pharmaceutical companies had unreasonably restricted access to 
an essential facility preventing production of fi xed-dose combination medi-
cines. The Commission therefore authorised any person to exploit and market 
generic versions of patents held by the two companies. In addition, it asked 
the two companies to pay a penalty of about ten percent of annual turnover of 
their ARVs sales in South Africa. Based on this decision the two companies 
announced voluntary licensing agreement with the complainants. 
 To support the assertion that Article 31(k) is not subject to paragraph 6 Deci-
sion of the Council for TRIPS is the provision of paragraph 9 of the Decision 
itself. That paragraph provides thus:
‘This Decision is without prejudice to the rights, obligations and flexibilities that 
Members have under the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement other than paragraph 
(f) and (h) of Article 31, including those reaffirmed by the Declaration, and to their 
interpretation. It is also without prejudice to the extent to which pharmaceutical prod-
ucts produced under a compulsory license can be exported under the present provi-
sions of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement.’
In view of the disappointing decision reached by the Council for TRIPS on 
paragraph 6 of Doha and its subsequent amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, 
Article 31(k) offers a way out for African countries to ensure affordability of 
drugs to their citizens by importing cheaper generic drugs through the use of 
compulsory licensing. But of course African governments must ensure that a 
clearly stated provision on compulsory licensing is contained in their patent 
laws. Moreover, a properly drafted competition legislation must exist which 
should clearly state what will amount to anti-competitive practice and the 
penalty for such practice. This has become very important in that, African 
governments are under obligations under international law to take every measure 
to ensure affordable drugs for their citizens. As noted by the Committee on 
126.  Ibid., Section 2(b).
127.  Ibid., Section 2(c).
128.  See ‘Competition Commission fi nds GSK and BI in Contravention of the Competition 
Act’, available at <www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2003/ns16_10_2003.htm> (accessed on 10 July 
2007).
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ICESCR in its General Comment 14, states have the duty to fulfi ll the right to 
health through legislative, administrative, budgetary and judicial steps.129 This 
duty encompasses a facilitative role on the part of the state – ensuring provision 
of cheaper life-saving drugs for citizens by third parties through appropriate 
legislation and policy.
5. SOME DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USE OF COMPULSORY 
 LICENSING
There have been some developments with respect to the use of compulsory 
licensing in recent times. In October 2002, the European Parliament adopted 
an amendment to the European Medicines Directive which states that ‘manu-
facturing shall be allowed if the medicinal product is intended for export to a 
third country that has issued a compulsory license for that product, or where 
a patent is not in force and if there is a request to that effect of the competent 
public health authorities of that third country’.130 Haochen has noted that this 
creates a good policy framework to balance the objectives of paragraph 4 of the 
Doha Declaration, while protecting the interests of patent owners.131 In response 
to the August 2003 Decision, a 2006 Regulation of the European Parliament 
has permitted use of compulsory licensing in EU members for export to least 
developed countries or other countries with incapacity to manufacture generic 
drugs and that has notifi ed the Council for TRIPS.132 It is worthy to mention that 
Article 6 of the Regulation urges EU members not to adopt any law or policies 
that will render cumbersome or diffi cult the application of the use of compul-
sory licensing within their territories.
 Another important development relates to a law passed by the Canadian 
government recently which aims at facilitating export of lower cost generic 
drugs to developing countries that lack the capacity to manufacture pharma-
ceutical products.133 This law allows the issuance of compulsory licences for 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to make generic versions of patented 
pharmaceuticals for export to countries that lack their own manufacturing 
capacity. The passage of Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa, makes Canada the fi rst 
country to adopt a law which permits the export of generic medicines manu-
129.  General Comment 14, supra n. 13, para. 38.
130.  Council Directive 2001/83/EC. Amendment 196 to the European Medicines Directive, 
adopted 23 October 2002. 
131.  S. Haochen, ‘A Wider Access to Patented Drugs under the TRIPS Agreement’, 21 Bos-
ton Univ. ILJ (2003) p. 101.
132.  Regulation (EC) No. 816/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 
2006 on compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products 
for export to countries with public health problems.
133.  The Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act, Bill C-9 (2004) amends the Patent Act and the 
Food and Drugs Act.
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factured under compulsory license from a developed country to developing 
countries in the post August 2003 Decision. Under this law, the amount to be 
paid as royalty for use of a patent will depend on the ranking of the importing 
country on the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index 
(HDI). This may be in the interest of African countries as they are likely to be 
among the importing countries targeted under the law. This law has been hailed 
as a positive development in promoting access to medicines for poor coun-
tries of Africa. The law has also received the blessing of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),134 a treaty which requires strict protection for 
patent holders in North America. 
 The law, however, contains some limitations such as restrictions on 
non-WTO members to qualify as importing countries for the purpose of 
benefi ting from exports under the law. It has also been criticised for allowing 
patent holders to apply for a court order terminating a compulsory licensing or 
ordering a higher royalty in certain situations.135 Other fl aws in the law include 
restriction in lists of drugs that may be subject to compulsory licensing for 
export, two-year period for the production of the generic drugs and need to seek 
permission from patent holders before exporting manufactured generic drugs.136
 A practical challenge in invoking the provision of the Canadian law occurred 
recently when MSF in May of 2004 placed an order under this law to supply 
drugs to one of its fi elds project in a developing country. This required MSF 
to locate a local generic manufacturing company within Canada.137 After a 
long search MSF was able to locate Apotex a generic pharmaceutical company 
which agreed to produce a three-in-one antiretroviral combination of zidovu-
dine, lamivudine and nevirapine (AZT+3TC+NVP), drugs which represent one 
of the fi rst-line treatment regimens for HIV recommended by the WHO. Apotex 
had to develop a fi xed-dose combination of these drugs to simplify treatment 
for those in need. When this was done it required the Canadian legislature to 
amend the schedule to the new patent law, since the new fi xed-dose combina-
tion was not included in the schedule of drugs qualifi ed to be exported in the 
legislation. This took some time before it was done sometimes in September 
2005. When this hurdle was crossed it became necessary for Apotex in 2006 to 
negotiate with the company holding the patent over the proposed drugs to be 
134.  This Agreement was launched in January 1994 with Canada, Mexico and the US as par-
ties to the Agreement. It established one of the world’s largest free trade areas.
135.  Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, ‘Global Access to Treatment: Canada’s Bill c-9 
and the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals for Export to Countries of Need’, available at 
<www.aidslaw.ca/Maincontent/issues/cts/patent-amend/billC-9fl yer300604.pdf> (accessed on 6 
June 2007).
136.  R. Elliott, ‘TRIPS from Doha to Cancun … to Ottawa: Global Development in Access to 
Treatment and Canada Bill C-56’, 8 Canadian HIV/AIDS Law Policy Review (2003) p. 1. Origi-
nally the now Bill C-9 was known as Bill C-56.
137.  R. Elliot, ‘Will They Deliver Treatment Access?: WTO Rules and Canada’s Law on Ge-
neric Medicine Exports’, 11 Canadian HIV/AIDS Law Policy Review (2006) p. 13.
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exported under compulsory licensing. Apotex was only able to get the go-ahead 
from the patient holder sometime in August of 2007. This clearly exempli-
fi es the diffi culty which may be encountered in successfully invoking use of 
compulsory licensing even under the Canadian legislation. An indication that 
the recently adopted amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, which is based on 
the August 2003 Decision of the Council for TRIPS, will likely hinder access to 
life-saving drugs for people in poor countries.
 Similarly, India has recently introduced an amendment to its patent law in 
compliance with its TRIPS obligation.138 Prior to this amendment, the Indian 
Patent Act of 1970 completely prohibited patent product for medicines. This 
has in turn served as one of the major incentives for the growth of a strong 
generic pharmaceutical industry in that country.139 During the early years of 
development in India up to the time the Patent Act was passed in 1970 the 
pharmaceutical industry witnessed a relatively small growth accounting for just 
25 percent of the domestic market. However, the restriction on product patent, 
prices and foreign investment triggered a rapid development of the industry 
which now accounts for up to 70 percent of the domestic market meeting nearly 
all the demands for formulations.140 A signifi cant consequence of this develop-
ment in the generic pharmaceutical industry is the lower prices of drugs in India 
compared to other countries of the world. While prices of drugs in India were 
one of the highest in the world at the early age of development, they are today 
one of the cheapest.141
 But with the coming into existence of a new law in early 2005 patent product 
for medicines is now protected in India.142 Under the new law, generic drugs 
discovered prior to 1995 are exempted from patent protection. However, drugs 
produced after this year will be subject to patent protection in line with Article 
70(8) and (9) of TRIPS. The Indian government prior to this law had created 
the so-called mail box applications for patent. This implies that these applica-
tions were already on the waiting line before 2005 when India complied with 
her obligations under TRIPS by recognising patents for pharmaceuticals. The 
implication of this is that in the event that any of these applications is granted, 
generic manufacturer of such drugs will have to pay a reasonable amount as 
royalty to the patent holder. This portion of the Act which fails to explain what 
will amount to a reasonable royalty has been criticised for being vague and 
138.  The Patents (Amendment) Act (Bill 32-C of 2005) of India.
139.  J.O. Lanjouw, ‘The Introduction of Pharmaceutical patent in India: Heartless Exploita-
tion of the Poor and Suffering?’, NBER Working Paper (Cambridge, MA, NBER 1998) p. 24.
140.  Government of India, Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, ‘Annual Report 
(1999-2000)’, available at <chemicals.nic.in/annrep99.htm>.
141.  S. Chandhri, ‘The Evolution of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry’, in G. Frelker, et al., eds, 
The Pharmaceutical Industry in India and Hungary: Policies, Institutions and Technological De-
velopment (Washington, DC, World Bank 1997) p. 6.
142.  See The Patents (Amendment) Act, supra n. 114.
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subject to controversy.143 It has been suggested that between 3 to 4 percent 
royalty be adopted in conformity with international norms.144 There are fears 
already being expressed in many African countries that this law may likely 
hinder access to cheaper drugs in future.
 It is signifi cant to note that this new law provides for the issuance of compul-
sory licensing to export to a country with insuffi cient capacity, provided 
that country through notifi cation allowed such importation. This is no doubt 
a welcome development, however; the viability of this provision is yet to be 
ascertained in view of December 2005 amendment of the TRIPS Agreement.145
6. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
One emerging debate in the international human rights arena has to do with 
the relationship between intellectual property rights and states’ obligation 
under human right treaties. This is particularly important when one considers 
the fact that intellectual property rights is also recognised under human rights 
instruments. Notable among these instruments are the UDHR and the ICESCR. 
Article 27(1) of the UDHR provides: ‘Every one has the right to the mate-
rial protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientifi c, 
literary, or artistic production of which he is the author.’ Article 15 of the 
ICESCR also recognises the right of everyone to take part in the cultural life, to 
enjoy the benefi ts of scientifi c progress and its application and to benefi t from 
the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientifi c, 
literary or artistic production of which he/she is the author. 
 It would seem from these provisions that these instruments seek to strike a 
balance between interest of the public to benefi t from technology and that of 
the inventor of the technology. This would obviously require a human rights 
approach. Such an approach, as suggested by Chapman, should be ‘predicated 
on the centrality of protecting and nurturing human dignity and the common 
good’.146 The goal is to improve human welfare and not to maximize economic 
benefi ts.147 In other words, ‘from a human rights perspective, intellectual prop-
erty protection is understood more as a social product with a social function and 
not primarily as an economic relationship’.148
143.  G. Crues, ‘India: New Patent Law May Restrict Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment’, 10 Ca-
nadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network Policy and Review (2005) p. 28.
144.  MSF, ‘The Beginning of the End of Affordable Generics’, 22 March 2005, available at 
<www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=2232005174897&contenttype> (accessed 
on 7 June 2007).
145.  See Section 55 amending Section 92 of the original Act.
146.  A.R. Chapman, ‘The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property Protection’, 
5 Journal of International Economic Law (2002) p. 861 at p. 867.
147.  Ibid., at p. 868.
148.  Ibid.
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 This observation further receives support from the history of the drafting 
of these instruments. A critical examination of the events leading to the even-
tual drafting of the two articles in the two human rights instruments mentioned 
above reveal that basic human rights documents never intended to recognise 
interests of authors or inventors as fundamental human rights.149 For instance, 
the original Article 27 of the UDHR never contained a second paragraph.150 
It was based on the suggestion by Mexico that this paragraph was included. 
Mexico had argued for additional rights to the one already protected under 
the 1948 Bogota Declaration.151 This was to be for the benefi t of intellectual 
workers, scientist or writer, so that all forms of work – manual and intellec-
tual – will receive same protection.152 The introduction of intellectual property 
rights was intended to serve as a sort of discouragement to greedy activities 
of foreign publishing houses. Statements of many countries during the debates 
concerning this article revealed that the clause was merely analysed from a 
copyright perspective only.153
 Similarly, sub-paragraph (c) of Article 15(1) was not part of the original draft 
Covenant of 1954 which merely contained two paragraphs – (a) and (b). There-
fore, Article 15(1)(c) must be seen as an addition to this particular Article and 
should not be accorded preference over the fi rst two sub-paragraphs.154 In actual 
fact, Article 15(1)(c) only refers to ‘authors’ an indication that its addition to 
the original Article 15(1) – sponsored by Costa Rica and Uruguay – was to 
protect authors against improper action on the part of publishers.155 It was never 
intended to qualify the two preceding sub-paragraphs, but merely to highlight a 
particular challenge.156 Commenting on this provision, Hestermeyer has argued 
that it was never the intention of the ICESCR to elevate intellectual property 
law to a status of a human right.157 He argues further that, assuming that Article 
15(1)(c) creates a fundamental rights at all, this would not apply to ‘patents’ or 
149.  UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Globalization 
and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Res. 2001/5 (15 August 2001), UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/2001/5.
150.  See UN, Report of the 3rd Session of the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/800 
(1948).
151.  See Art. 13 of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, OEA/Ser.L.V/
II.82 doc.6 rev.1 (1948), UN, Draft International Declaration of Human Rights – Mexico Amend-
ment to Article 25 of the Draft Declaration, UN Doc. A/C.3/266 (1948) note that Art. 27 of ICCPR 
used to be Art. 25 in the original draft.
152.  UN Third Committee Summary Records of Meetings, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.799 (1957).
153.  See, for example, Statement of Dominican Republic supporting the amendment, UN Doc. 
A/C.3/SR.799 (1957), India which abstained, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.798 (1957).
154.  Cullet, supra n. 31, at p. 150.
155.  See Draft International Covenant on Human Rights, Report of the 3rd Committee, UN 
Doc. A/3764 (1957).
156.  Cullet, supra n. 31, at p. 150.
157.  H. Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medi-
cines (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007) p. 154.
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‘copyrights’ neither will it apply to pharmaceutical companies since the Article 
adopts words such as ‘everyone’, ‘author’ or ‘he’ an indication that it was meant 
specifi cally to protect individuals.158 This appears to coincide with the position 
of the Committee on CESCR in its General Comment 17.159 Furthermore, the 
Committee has urged States Parties to strike an adequate balance between their 
obligations under Article 15(1)(c) and other rights guaranteed under the Cove-
nant.160 It reasons that in doing so, the private interests of authors should not be 
unduly favoured but rather preference should be given to public interest. 
 Arising from the above, since both the UDHR and the ICESCR recognise 
the right of every one to benefi t from cultural life and scientifi c development, 
it would seem to be that the right of an individual author is secondary to that 
of the society in balancing of priorities.161 Thus, the focus of human rights 
instruments is on societal benefi ts, while intellectual property places emphasis 
on individual’s rights and protection. Therefore, neither the UDHR nor the 
ICESCR can be invoked by pharmaceutical companies to justify hindrance to 
access to life-saving medications in Africa.162 On the whole, a major difference 
exists between intellectual property rights and human rights. While the former 
are temporary rights granted by the state and subject to revocation by same, the 
latter are inalienable and timeless.163
 Under international law there is a growing consensus of the primacy of inter-
national human rights laws over other treaties. This is evident in the Vienna 
Programme of Action where it was agreed that the protection and promotion of 
human rights ‘is the fi rst responsibility of governments’.164 This appears to be a 
reaffi rmation of Article 1(3) of the UN Charter which is to the effect that one of 
the purposes of the UN shall be to strive towards ‘promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all’.165 Besides, 
Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that ‘[i]n event of a confl ict between 
the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter 
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations 
under the present Charter shall prevail’.166 Under the Vienna Law of Treaties it 
158.  Ibid.
159.  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Right of Everyone to Ben-
efi t from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientifi c, Literary 
or Artistic Production of Which he or she is the Author, General Comment No. 17 (2005), UN 
Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (12 January 2006), para. 7.
160.  Ibid., para. 35.
161.  Cullet, supra n. 31, at p. 152.
162.  Hestermeyer, supra n. 157, at p. 158.
163.  Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Statement of the Committee on Economic, 
 Social and Cultural Rights; Follow up to the discussion on Article 15, UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 
(26 November 2001).
164.  Vienna Programme of Action, supra n. 19, Part 1, Art. 1.
165.  Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945 (entered into force 24 October 1945), TS 67 
(1946).
166.  Ibid.
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is provided that the determination of states’ rights and obligations pursuant to 
their treaties are ‘subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations’.167 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has addressed this issue in the Aerial 
Incident over Lockerbie case.168 In that case, the ICJ rejected the argument of 
Libya that, under the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, it was entitled to choose domestic 
prosecution over extradition of those accused of the airplane bombing in ques-
tion. Rather the ICJ ruled that the UN Charter (Art. 25) requires UN member 
states to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, and this Charter obli-
gation prevailed over the provisions of the Montreal Convention. Thus, Libya 
was legally required to comply with the UN Security Council’s resolution 
requiring extradition of the accused. One may conclude, therefore, that since 
all the members of WTO are members of the UN, which is founded on respect 
for human rights – and most have ratifi ed different human rights treaties – their 
obligations under the latter supercede the former.
 It has been observed that even though the right to health does not constitute 
a non-derogable right under international law, if a hierarchy was to be estab-
lished between human rights and intellectual property rights; it is most likely 
that the former would take precedence over the latter.169 Forman similarly notes 
that no parity exists in the nature of human rights to essential medicines and 
intellectual property rights, since the latter are better understood as legal entitle-
ments than as fundamental rights.170 She further argues that the human rights of 
the most vulnerable and the poor should be prioritised when they confl ict with 
trade and intellectual property interest.171 Whilst Hestermeyer would not admit 
that human rights law is of a higher normative level than the WTO regime, he 
submits that it is of a higher appeal than WTO law.172 However, he was quick 
to add that the strong enforcement nature of human rights seems to put WTO 
law on a higher level in a factual hierarchy of regimes, ‘so that ultimately state 
behaviour will largely be determined by the solution found within the WTO 
regime’.173 However, the UN Sub Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights has lent its voice to this issue. It has urged states to ‘ensure 
that the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does not negatively impact 
on the enjoyment of human rights as provided for in international human rights 
167.  Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, entered into force on 27 January 1980, 1155 
UNTS p. 331, 8 ILM p. 679.
168.  Order of 14 April 1992 (regarding Request for Indication of Provisional Measures), ICJ 
Reports (1992) p. 3, para. 42.
169.  Cullet, supra n. 31.
170.  L. Forman, ‘Trade Rules, Intellectual Property and the Right to Health’, 21 Ethics and 
International Affair (2007) p. 337 at p. 347.
171.  Ibid.
172.  Hestermeyer, supra n. 157, at p. 206.
173.  Ibid.
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instruments by which they are bound’.174 It particularly reminds governments 
of the need to give primacy to obligations under human rights treaties over 
economic policies or any other international agreements
 This area of the law, however, remains unsettled. This certainly calls for 
urgent attention and clarification in the international law arena. But the 
Committee on CESCR has urged States Parties to the Covenant to always bear 
in mind their obligations under international human rights law – particularly 
the Covenant – when ratifying other treaties relating to trade. The Committee 
has further noted recently that states’ obligations under Article 15(1)(c) of the 
Covenant should not constitute impediments to fulfi lling their core obligations 
in relation to right to health and that states have the duty ‘to prevent unreason-
ably high cost for access to essential medicines’.175
7. CONCLUSION
While the above-mentioned developments in the use of compulsory licensing 
are welcomed they have not by any means resolved the problem on the use of 
compulsory licensing. The recent amendment to the TRIPS Agreement which 
should have provided an opportunity for members of the WTO to explicitly 
address the problem posed by use of compulsory licensing, fails to meet the 
aspiration of the people in developing countries in dire need of life-saving 
drugs. The amendment as it stands merely reinforces insensitivity and cynicism 
on the part of developed countries with regard to ensuring access to life-saving 
medicines for people in poor regions. It is of great concern, that the historic 
Declaration at Doha is being undermined by the negative attitudes of developed 
countries to the use of compulsory licensing. This is prejudicial to the interest 
of Africans who are in dire need of life-saving medications.
 The high mortality rate for HIV/AIDS every year in Africa is particularly 
worrisome. While infected people in the developed world have been able to 
mitigate the impact of the epidemic through use of ARVs, the same cannot be 
said of their counter parts in Africa who lack access to these drugs due to high 
cost. This merely exemplifi es the gross inequities that exist between the north 
and the south. Although the TRIPS in its principles and objectives clearly set 
out to correct these inequities, its actual implementation has failed to do this. As 
pointed out by UNDP ‘[a] single set of minimum rules may seem to create level 
playing fi eld, since one set of rules applies to all. But as currently practiced the 
game is not fair because the players are of such unequal strength economically 
and institutionally.’176 The August 2003 Decision of the Council for TRIPS and 
174.  UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, supra n. 149. 
175.  General Comment 17, supra n. 159, para. 35.
176.  UNDP, Human Development Report: Making Technologies Work for Human Develop-
ment (New York, UNDP 2001) p. 7.
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the December 2005 amendment of the TRIPS Agreement in response to para-
graph 6 of Doha are in the least very disappointing. The Council should have 
done better than this. As shown in this article a practical implementation of both 
Decision and the amendment may indeed pose serious problems for intending 
nation seeking to invoke the use of compulsory licensing. This can be described 
as nothing but a Greek gift.
 It may be contended that developed countries and pharmaceutical companies 
both have the duty under international law to ensure that their actions do not by 
any means hinder access to medicines for those in poor countries of the world.177 
Indeed, the Committee on CESCR in its General Comment 14 does observe 
that ‘States parties have an obligation to ensure that their actions as members 
of international organizations take due account of the right to health’.178 The 
Committee similarly urges non-state actors to ensure that their activities do not 
in any way impede the enjoyment of the right to health. The UN Millennium 
Development Goals in goal number 8 also call for cooperation between devel-
oped countries and developing countries in eradicating poverty in the world. 
This cooperation can similarly apply to ensuring access to life-saving medica-
tions for people in poor regions as Africa. Since a correlation exists between 
poor health and poverty. As rightly pointed out by the Special Rapporteur on 
the right to health ‘international assistance and cooperation require that all those 
in a position to assist should, fi rst, refrain from acts that make it more diffi cult 
for the poor to realize their right to health and, second, take measures to remove 
obstacles that impede the poor’s realization of the right to health’.179
177.  See A. Buchaman and M. Decamp, ‘Responsibility for Global Health’, 27 Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics (2006) p. 95 at p. 110.
178.  General Comment 14, supra n. 13, para. 39.
179.  See the Preliminary Report of Paul Hunt, Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, to the Fifty-Ninth Session of the 
UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/59/422 (2004), para. 33.
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